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Tempestian Politics

Foundations of Political Philosophy in
The Tempest
Andrew Fellows

In recent times, much of the critical scholarly discussion
surrounding Shakespeare’s The Tempest has assumed a postcolonial
perspective. At the center of such discussion, as Rowland Wymer argues,
resides the distinction between Prospero and Caliban as colonizer and
colonized respectively, essentially transporting the play to the context of
New World colonization (3). Such a focus, while important and intellectually
beneficial, looks past a number of even more basic questions and issues that
the text raises. Beyond any regard of the play as a postcolonial text, it can be
more fundamentally regarded as a political play, or even, as R. Grant puts it, a
play “all about politics” (244). Indeed, as Wymer points out, “A reading which
emphasizes questions of power, legitimacy, [and] conquest . . . need look no
further than the . . . world in which the play is literally set” (1). Let us then
follow this course—one that emphasizes and examines such political questions
without any postcolonial recontexualization. Instead of imposing any specific
political theory or philosophy on the play, let us instead attempt to impose the
play on political theory and philosophy.
Due to the play’s thoroughly political nature, we might easily wonder
what Shakespeare’s own opinions were regarding politics and the government.
We could ask, for example, what Shakespeare’s thoughts were on the origins
and the derivation of political authority. Or what, according to him, gave it
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legitimacy and lent to its sustainability? How did he feel about real-life political
situations that paralleled those of his plays’ characters? While it remains
ultimately impossible to know Shakespeare’s mind on these matters, The
Tempest readily provides insights into these questions when read as a political
treatise. Such a reading becomes even more compelling when one considers
that it was not written in a historical political vacuum. Almost exactly one
hundred years before The Tempest was first produced, Niccolò Machiavelli,
the “founder of modern political science,” produced his most famous work, the
political treatise The Prince. Commonly held as a “teacher of evil” and referred
to by Shakespeare himself as “murtherous Machevil” in Henry VI, Machiavelli
and his treatise, which advised how to “acquire power, create a state, and keep
it” (Mansfield), provide a philosophical precedent to which Shakespeare’s
philosophy, as we shall see, provides nearly diametric opposition. Having first
explored Shakespeare’s philosophy in full, I will more fully explore the contrast
between Machiavelli and Shakespeare’s nearly contemporaneous philosophies
at the end of my analysis.
Considering the play’s ending and conclusions, Prospero, the rightful duke
of Milan, lies at the center and as the foundation of its political commentary.
While he, like any Shakespearean hero, exhibits flaws and imperfections as
both a person and a leader, he ultimately proves to be just, moral, and merciful.
Though the perspectives of varying theories may render him a cruel despot,
a dominating colonizer, an evil magus with “near-demonic” power (Cefalu
105), or otherwise, it’s hard to deem him anything but justified—as he likely
was to Shakespeare—without the invocation of anachronistic ideas and ideals.
Likewise, though certain theories may raise doubts about the reliability of his
narration, we will, in lieu of the confirmation of his benevolence and goodness
at the play’s conclusion, lend his words our trust and confidence.
Thus presupposing Prospero as the play’s political hero and embodied
representation of its political ideals, while simultaneously demonstrating his
true heroic nature, I argue that The Tempest establishes the framework for a
new and uniquely Shakespearean political philosophy. To get to the heart of
this philosophy, I will read the play as a dramatic political treatise that poses
and answers very important political questions. For this reading, I will examine
the topics of the derivation, legitimacy, and sustainability of socio-political
authority as shown through the political relationships between Prospero and
Caliban; Ariel, Miranda, the shipwrecked Alonso, Antonio, and Sebastian;
and the relation between Stefano, Trinculo, and Caliban. Undertaking such
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examination, I will demonstrate that The Tempest’s philosophy ultimately
venerates and vindicates authority based on legitimate succession, familial
loyalty, just retribution, moral obligation, intelligence, and justly exercised
power, while simultaneously demonizing and deconstructing authority based
on unjust usurpation, opportunism, immorality, vengeance, and unjustly
exercised power. Echoing the sentiments of fellow critic Elliot Visconsi, I do not
wish to “overturn the powerful colonial readings of the play, but instead [hope]
to thicken our account of the play’s metropolitan ambitions” (3). We shall call
this newly discovered theory Tempestian Political Philosophy.
In relation to postcolonial readings of The Tempest, many scholars focus
on the influence of William Strachey’s account of the Bermuda shipwreck on
the play. However, as Wymer points out, “what may have primarily interested
Shakespeare in [this] account . . . was not so much the prospect of contact
with the New World and its inhabitants, as the breakdown of authority which
occurred in the group of colonists who were shipwrecked” (10). This perspective
rings true considering that, as the play begins, all forms of traditional
government and authority are broken down and left to be filled by newly derived
replacements. The first scene of Act I sees the breaking storm and the breaking
down of the authority preexistent on the ship. As the wind rages and the
waves roar, the emergency and danger present renders all authority impotent:
“What cares these roarers for the name of king?” Gonzalo’s frustration swells
as the Boatswain disregards his “authority” and deliberately pays no heed to
“whom [he] hast aboard” (1.1.17). Shortly after, we learn from Ariel that he has
“dispersed them ‘bout the isle” and cast them on foreign soil (1.2.221). Here King
Alonso and Duke Antonio have no claims to power or dominion. Immediately
following the turmoil aboard the ship, we also hear of Prospero’s own political
downfall. He recounts to Miranda how, by trusting too much in his brother
Antonio, he was betrayed, cast out, and cast ashore on the island. Act I thus
presents two parallel stories of authority’s collapse and breakdown. It leaves a
vacuum of political power that Shakespeare proceeds to fill.
After the collapse of all authority, we begin to learn of the emerging power
structures taking its place. Thus our first critical question arises, regarding
derivation of political authority. In other words, what sources and foundations
of authority does the play explore? We quickly learn that Prospero reigns as the
absolute ruler of the island; but how, from such lowly beginnings, did he gain
that power? Caliban relates his perspective by stating:
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“This Island’s mine, by Sycorax my mother, which thou tak’st from me.
When thou cam’st first, thou strok’st me and made much of me, would give me
water with berries in’t, and teach me how to name the bigger light and how the
less, that burn by day and night; and then I loved thee, and showed thee all the
qualities o’th’ isle… For I am all the subjects that you have, which first was mine
own king” (1.2.334-345).
Thus Prospero’s authority over Caliban and the island originally stems from
a mutual regard, even friendship or love, that the two shared after Prospero’s
arrival. Caliban, lacking any challenge to his authority, acts as the de facto
leader of the island until someone comes whose intelligence naturally gives
him a position of preeminence. Yet Prospero does not use this potential edge
of authority to usurp him. After Caliban’s account, Prospero quickly retorts, “I
have used thee, filth as thou art, with human care, and lodged thee in mine
own cell, till thou didst seek to violate the honour of my child” (1.2.348-351).
Prospero had an implicitly peaceful agreement with Caliban until the later
violated said agreement when he attempted to violate Miranda. Here we learn
that Prospero’s authority only becomes supreme when forced to suppress the
other’s crimes. Rather than exhibiting any form of opportunism, he becomes
the island’s new de facto ruler in order to enact justice. While his supernatural
abilities here go unmentioned, we can infer that they were the means that
Prospero used to subdue the criminal Caliban. Indeed, as Caliban later asserts,
“I say by sorcery he got this isle; from me he got it” (3.2.50-51). Therefore, we
can conclude that Prospero’s original authority over the island derives both
from his just retribution of Caliban and the supernatural power with which he
exercised said retribution.
Similarly Prospero’s authority over Ariel, though also contingent upon
Prospero’s sorcerous magical abilities of control, does not appear to be wholly
founded upon them. Caliban thinks that, without his books, Prospero “hath not
one spirit to command” and that “they all do hate him as rootedly” (3.2.88-90)
as he does, but this doesn’t appear to be the case with Ariel. Though Prospero’s
power or art was used to free Ariel, as he relates, “It was mine art, when I arrived
and heard thee, that made gape the pine and let thee out” (1.2.291-93), the basis
of his authority over Ariel seems to derive instead from some sort of moral
obligation as the “right of the liberator” and “rests, we might say, on imputed
contract” (Grant 252). In the case of Ariel, Prospero’s authority initially stems
from his power and abilities but on a more fundamental level from a morally
incurred debt.
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Apart from Caliban and Ariel, Prospero’s authority over Miranda and the
shipwrecked castaways needs consideration. Unlike Caliban and Ariel, in
whose cases Prospero’s authority resists reduction to a single factor, Prospero’s
authority over Miranda finds basis purely on his position as her father and
member of her family, while his power over Ferdinand, Alonso, Sebastian,
Antonio, and the rest of the castaways is based solely on his ability to exert
power over them. Through his power, they are brought to the island in the first
place, are held on it, and are eventually able to return home. Yet, until now,
we have overlooked a very important question: If Prospero derives his political
authority primarily from his supernatural abilities, from whence does he receive
these abilities?
Though multiple references are made to Prospero’s righteously exercised
supernatural abilities, very little about them is stated explicitly. Upon his
banishment from Milan, he receives from the beneficent Gonzalo many of
the precious books in his possession. In Act I, Scene 2, it becomes clear that
he was deeply studious and well-educated in the liberal arts even before his
banishment. Caliban first draws the connection between his books and his
power, declaring that “without them, he’s but a sot,” and so it would appear
that his learning directly relates to his “art” (3.2.87-88). Whether his power
extends directly or indirectly from his books, they act as the “symbols of [his]
knowledge” and, as Zolfagharkhani and Heshmatifar argue, its basis as well (7).
Moreover, while he also employs his staff and coat in his magical practice, they
seem to be mere mediums through which the power manifests itself rather than
the sources of it. Indeed Prospero’s authority comes from his magic, which in
turn comes from his extensive learning.
Yet Prospero is not the only one who seizes new authority. In the accounts
of the past as recalled by Prospero, his brother Antonio takes and usurps the
dukedom of Milan. Returning to the present, Stefano, the king’s butler, also
gains authority over Caliban. Both cases, as negative foils to Prospero’s power,
merit examination. We learn from Prospero that he, in complete confidence,
leaves the governing of Milan to Antonio while he “neglect[ed] worldly ends”
and “dedicated [himself] to the bettering of [his] mind” (1.2.89-90). He devotes
himself to personal and intellectual affairs while turning all civic affairs to his
brother. Believing himself to be the true duke, Antonio then conspires with
Alonso, King of Naples, to overthrow and banish Prospero. He succeeds in this
dark endeavor and gains his desired power. His power derives from nothing
more than treachery, illegitimacy, and usurpation and is motivated by the
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ambition for glory and material possession, as he has already been in charge of
the governing of Milan.
Pertaining to the derivation of authority in the case of Stefano and Caliban,
very little substance or depth exists in the newfound authority. Seeing Stefano
as a source of new hope for vengefully tearing down Prospero’s authority as well
as a provider of “celestial liquor,” Caliban readily commits himself to this new
slavery. In return for alcohol and freedom from Prospero, he will grant Stefano
his servitude, kingship over the island, and Miranda as his bride. Punished at
the hands of Prospero and made desperate by his dire circumstances, Caliban
holds a strong reverence for the perceived beneficence he receives at the hands
of Stefano. Thus Stefano’s power over Caliban develops simply from a very
weak and even immoral quid pro quo alliance. It comes from nothing more
than the perceived ability of Stefano to give the liberty and liquor that Caliban
desires and the ability of Caliban to facilitate Stefano’s takeover and to answer
to Stefano’s whims.
Therefore, taking all accounts of the derivation of authority into account,
what does The Tempest have to say on the matter? With Prospero as our guiding
touchstone, we must conclude that authority is rightly derived when based on
moral obligation of subject to benefactor; that authority is negated by crime and
justified when relegated to the enactor of justice and retribution; that deference
to family and father are correct; and finally that authority is properly based on
knowledge, wisdom, and learning. This presents a significant departure from
Machiavelli, whose Prince contains a chapter entitled “Concerning Those Who
Become Princes By Evil Means.” Therein he, far from condemning such wicked
derivations as Shakespeare does, actually offers advice on how to achieve
them. However, in open opposition to such philosophies, Tempestian Political
Philosophy clearly establishes that authority is wrongly derived when based on
selfish usurpation, material ambition, or the simple ability to satisfy base wants.
We must now concern ourselves with the question of whether Prospero’s
power is legitimate or, in other words, if it proves to be necessary and justified,
while contemplating if he truly has the right to authority. If he does, we must
consider what this suggests about the legitimization of power in general. To
provide an answer to this second very critical question of political legitimacy,
let us begin with the very controversial authoritative relationship between
Prospero and Caliban. As the veritable epicenter of most postcolonial criticism
of The Tempest, hardly any scholarly consensus exists on the nature and
morality of this relationship. As we have discussed, rather than a forced and
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opportunistic takeover, the shift of power from Caliban to Prospero’s can be
seen as one of just necessity. Given such a takeover, Prospero’s authority already
proves its legitimacy to a great degree, yet more can be said in his favor. Having
forfeited his authority on a moral basis, Caliban has rightfully lost his dominion
of the island. Prospero’s initial takeover, as well as his continued dominance, is
purely retributive and defensible. While he benefits from Caliban’s subjugation,
the benefit is not, as Grant points out, “a utilitarian justification of his slavery”
but rather “merely . . . a consequence of it” (252). As Caliban’s “attempt on
Miranda, and his lack of remorse, puts him beyond the pale of civil association,”
his treatment at the hands of Prospero is “duly justified: rationally, on . . .
grounds of self-defense, and morally, from breach of trust and ingratitude”
(251). While Prospero may admittedly act roughly and cruelly within the bounds
of his dominant relation to Caliban, the bounds themselves are justified and
legitimate.
Though similar to Caliban in terms of his slave-like usage, Prospero’s
authority over Ariel rests, as we have discussed, upon an almost purely moral
basis. Considering that Prospero freed Ariel from his former imprisonment and
thereby did him an infinite amount of good, it makes sense that Ariel would
wish to serve his benefactor. Yet, from Ariel’s pleas for freedom, his service is
clearly no longer purely voluntary. Since Prospero literally freed Ariel from
imprisonment, he “is thus entitled to treat the relationship from his side as at
least partially one of contract” (252). If viewed contractually, Ariel’s position
takes the dimensions of a servant or bondman rather than a slave. If viewed
in such light, it becomes easy to fathom how a seventeenth century political
philosophy would not take issue with such a relation. Beyond this, I would
suggest that the relation, as seen as a manifestation of our developing theory,
acts as a declaration of moral civil obligation. When the sovereign authority is
truly beneficial, as Prospero indeed is to Ariel, moral obligation (rather than a
legal one) arises on the part of the ruled to submit to authority.
While Prospero’s authority over Miranda requires nothing more than an
understandable deference to traditional patriarchy for justification, his power
over the castaways requires a bit more legitimizing. As we have discussed, the
first enabling factor of his power over Ferdinand, Alonso, Antonio, and the rest
comes from his supernatural abilities—but what justifies it? The answer to this
question rests on a better definition of what constitutes those supernatural
abilities. In contrast to Sycorax’s dark magic, Prospero’s magic is of a different
sort. As Stephen Greenblatt explains in his introduction to the play, a distinct
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difference exists between the high magus who “conjoin[s] contemplative
wisdom with virtuous action in order to confer great benefits upon his age” and
the dark magic used by Sycorax (366). Considering that Prospero uses his magic
for ultimately just and moral ends, I contend that he is of the previous magical
variety and is therefore justified in his exercise of authority over the others.
Beyond his legitimization through power and abilities, the facts of his
study and intelligence also contribute to his authority. His position as a “scholar
and a teacher” who “shapes the knowledge and develops the obedience of his
subjects through a pedagogical process” also serves effectively to increase his
legitimacy as acting sovereign of the island (Zolfagharkhani 9). As we see at
the play’s conclusion, not only does he educate his more permanent subjects
Miranda and Caliban, but his motive for the island-bound detention of the
castaways is to teach them a moral lesson. This leads us to further consider the
legitimacy rendered him by his position of moral justice. For Greenblatt, the
“legitimacy of Prospero’s power . . . depends on his claims to moral authority”
(367). Considering the aforementioned unjust derivation of Antonio’s authority,
Prospero’s power over the islanders as a means through which justice was served
renders that power thoroughly legitimate.
Prospero’s legitimacy thus established, let us quickly review the contrasting
illegitimacy of the other power structures in the play. As we have mentioned,
the reign of Sycorax was maintained by supernatural abilities, much like
Prospero’s. Yet from references to her as that “damned witch,” her banishment
from Algiers, her use of “sorceries terrible,” and her alleged union with the devil,
her magical abilities are clearly of a different kind and from a different source.
Her magic is a force that is, by its very nature, evil. While her authority could
be considered morally unjust and illegitimate on that basis alone, the details of
Ariel’s imprisonment incriminate her even further. Likewise Antonio’s authority,
with its morally dubious origins, immediately renders itself illegitimate. Yet
unlike Sycorax and Antonio, Stefano is no villain. Though he is not a “good”
character, he occupies a comic place rather than a villainous one. However,
what renders his authority illegitimate is being simply “‘charismatic’ . . . it is
self-evidently not moral, and being so ludicrously inefficient, can hardly be
called rational” (Grant 249). Having nothing more than liquor and charisma,
he is sorely unequipped to exercise authority over anyone. Furthermore, his
part of the bargain with Caliban originates from the agreement to enact bloody
vengeance, stripping it even further of any possible moral legitimacy.
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Having considered the legitimacy of the play’s relationships of authority,
we are now in a position to cast further light upon its political philosophy.
As with our examination of the play’s commentary on the derivation of
authority, we conclude once again that authority is legitimate when set against
criminality, when used for the purpose of self-defense, and when sustained
by moral obligation. Furthermore, according to Shakespeare’s Tempestian
Political Philosophy, authority is legitimized by righteous powers and abilities,
through study and intelligence, and as a medium through which moral justice
is exacted. Contrarily it renders all immorality—variably manifested through
Sycorax’s dark abilities, Antonio’s corruption, and Stefano’s charismatic and
vengeful opportunism—as an illegitimizing agent. Directly contradicting
Machiavelli and The Prince, which considers authority as legitimate as long as
it can be maintained, any power that is not purely moral is likewise illegitimate
(Mansfield).
Finally, having discussed the derivation and legitimacy of political authority,
I come to the third critical question of the sustainability of power. Setting aside
Prospero’s authority for a moment, I will return first to all cases of spurious and
unsustainable power that we have already discussed. The first of these ultimately
unsustainable cases, though long maintained, is the authority of Antonio as the
Duke of Milan. For twelve years, Antonio has held this office; yet at the hands
of Prospero, it returns to its rightful place. Is it providence or cosmic justice
that leads to the eventual downfall of Antonio’s reign, or is it simply Prospero’s
power exercised justly and opportunistically? Whichever it may be, the lack of
sustainability of Antonio’s unjustly usurped power plainly reveals itself through
its failure. When challenged by its legitimate possessor Prospero, Antonio
readily yields it rather than have it taken from him. As Alonso very willingly
and Antonio very hesitantly come to acknowledge their enacted injustice, they
make no qualms with Prospero’s rightful claim. Usurpation crumbles in the
face of justice, and Tempestian Political Philosophy once again rejects it. Like
Antonio’s dukedom, Stefano’s perceived authority quickly crumbles. As a result
of its weak derivation and illegitimacy, it breaks down just as quickly as it was
formed. While “Caliban gets tired of Stefano as soon as Stefano shows himself
incapable of concentrating on the plot against Prospero” (Grant 250), the weak
and immoral authority wanes until it completely shatters when Prospero and
Caliban meet in Act V. Here Caliban realizes “what a thrice-double ass” he’s
been to take the “drunkard for a god” and so foolishly submitted to his authority
(5.1.299-300).
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As for Prospero’s authority, which shows correct and just derivation
and legitimacy, we may now look at the sustainability thereof. Yet, having
discussed the means by which he holds his power, we need look no further
than those attributes of Prospero’s that we’ve already examined. With his
great supernatural power, intelligence, general virtue, moral uprightness, and
ability to force and coerce when necessary, it makes perfect sense that his power
could be sustained throughout his entire lifetime. Though he has agreed to
release Ariel, and eventually pardons and presumably leaves Caliban to his own
governing, his authority over them before their release is unchallenged. Since
the castaways recognize his power and authority, both as the rightful duke and
as ruler of the island, his reign conceivably would have continued had they
stayed upon the island. Thus, having an element of moral legitimacy to his reign
recognized by the castaways, it is unlikely that he would have faced opposition.
If any sort of rebellion had taken place, Prospero’s powers would allow him to
suppress it quickly. Thus the play has shown that not only is immoral authority
illegitimate but also lacks sustainability. That which establishes itself on
morally problematic ground, in any of the possible ways heretofore discussed,
makes itself vulnerable to quick defeat and destruction.
Beyond what we have been able to glean through these analyses of the cases
of derivation, legitimacy, and sustainability in the play, Prospero’s greatest
political act is his abdication from absolute supremacy. Though he can use his
power to maintain complete control not only over Ariel and Caliban but the
castaways as well, the fact that he mercifully releases both Ariel and Caliban
and only maintains what the castaways legally owe him opens perhaps the
greatest window into Shakespeare’s own philosophy. Ideal leadership does not
overreach beyond necessity or seize power where seizure proves unnecessary.
As with the Roman dictator who, before the times of Julius Caesar, held absolute
power only in times of necessity, Prospero very righteously steps down from his
place of dominance and avoids the fate of that other Shakespearean ruler.
Although we have examined the questions of derivation, legitimacy,
and sustainability separately and in that order in this paper, we could have
formulated our central question a different way. We may have asked, “How is
legitimate authority derived and sustained in The Tempest?” instead. Or we
could have asked, “How, once derived, is authority legitimized and sustained?”
Yet, regardless of how we articulate the question, the central political thrust
of The Tempest remains the same. In the end it reveals the same political
perspectives and values. Following a mere century after Niccolò Machiavelli’s
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The Prince, a work which advocated that a leader “forgo the standard of ‘what
should be done’” and that he “must learn how not to be good,” The Tempest’s
strong emphasis on adherence to morality represents a strong political statement
against such philosophies (Mansfield). In further contrast to Machiavelli’s
philosophy, which includes the famous idea that “ends justify the means,” and
reveres the leader who criminally seizes authority, The Tempest has conclusively
venerated authority based on familial loyalty, criminal justice, just retribution,
moral obligation, intelligence, learning, and righteously exercised powers and
abilities. It has simultaneously condemned and denounced authority based on
unjust usurpation, opportunism, immorality of any sort, vengeance, and evil or
unjustly exercised powers and abilities. Furthermore, starkly contrasting the
positive emphasis Machiavelli put on glory, absolutism, and “well used” cruelty,
it emphasizes temperance of authority, limits of power, and mercy toward
subjects. Set starkly against Machiavelli’s political precedent, Shakespeare’s
contribution to the world of political philosophy and his participation in
the conversation becomes apparent. While we may never have any certainty
of Shakespeare’s political opinions, this look into his Tempestian Political
Philosophy provides a significant clue to the question and reveals the basic
foundation for a uniquely Shakespearean political theory.
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